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EMERGENCY OFFSITE PLANNING AND
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: THE
OPPOSITION AND THE FEDERAL
RESPONSE
Federal law requires a state, local or utility emergency offsite
preparedness plan before licensing a nuclear power plant.1 Some state
and local governments that are located in an emergency planning zone
(EPZ)2 must prepare emergency offsite plans.3 EPZs are areas within
either a ten or fifty mile radius of a nuclear power plant.4 The emer-
gency plans delegate responsibility for their implementation to various
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982) as amended by Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295,
94 Stat. 781, 783-84.
2. The EPZ consists of a plume exposure pathway 10 miles in radius and an inges-
tion pathway 50 miles in radius. Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities, 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(c)(2) (1989). However, the exact size depends on local
emergency response needs and capabilities and such conditions as topography,
demographics, land characteristics, access routes and jurisdictional boundaries. Id. See
In re Long Island Lighting Co., 26 N.R.C. 393, 395 (1987) (Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission held that adjustments to the 10 mile plume exposure pathway are justifiable to
prevent EPZ boundaries from cutting schools or hospitals in half or arbitrarily carving
out small portions of governmental jurisdiction); In re Boston Edison Co., 19 N.R.C.
542, 551-52 (1984) (Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement denied peti-
tioner's request to enlarge the plume exposure pathway based on projected radiation
doses exceeding the EPA Protective Action Guide outside the ten mile plume exposure
pathway).
3. Sylves, Nuclear Power Plants and Emergency Planning: An Intergovernmental
Nightmare, 44 PuB. ADMIN. Rv. 393, 397 (1984) (local governments within the Emer-
gency Planning Zone (EPZ) must prepare emergency plans unless they are in an adja-
cent state where the adjacent state's plan overlaying the local government is deemed
sufficient).
4. Id. at 395.
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agencies and political bodies.' These plans contain lists of available
resources, 6 duties of individuals or groups,7 and schedules and proce-
dures8 for mass evacuation. Responsibility for the review and approval
of emergency plans lies with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)9 and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)1 °
This Note will focus on state and local governments' refusal to par-
ticipate in offsite emergency planning, which interferes with the licens-
ing of nuclear power plants. Part I summarizes the history of offsite
emergency preparedness plans. Part II examines the substantive re-
5. Id.
6. Resources include equipment, personnel and facilities. Emergency Planning and
Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E
§ IV.E-F (1989).
7. Emergency plans designate those who will take charge in an emergency, plant
staff assignments and expectations of state, local or federal agencies. Id.
8. These procedures include description of the means to notify the public in an
emergency and to disseminate information concerning the emergency plans. Id.
9. The NRC is responsible for the evaluation and approval of onsite and offsite
emergency plans. Specifically, they are:
To assess licensee emergency plans for adequacy.
To verify that the licensee emergency plans are adequately implemented; e.g., ade-
quacy and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, staffing levels and quali-
fications, and equipment.
To review the FEMA findings and determinations on the adequacy and capability
of implementation of state and local plans.
To make decisions with regard to the overall state of emergency preparedness -
i.e., integration of the licensee's emergency preparedness and the state and local
governments', as determined by FEMA and reviewed by NRC - and the issuance
of operating licenses or shutdown of operating reactors.
Perry, Off-site Preparedness and Nuclear Power Plant Licensing, 111 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
27, 28-29 (April 28, 1983).
10. FEMA's sole responsibility concerns the adequacy of offsite emergency
preparedness plans. Specifically, the agency's responsibilities are:
To make findings and determinations as to whether state and local emergency
plans are adequate.
To verify that the state and local emergency plans are capable of being imple-
mented; e.g., adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, staffing
levels and qualifications, and equipment.
To assume responsibility for emergency preparedness training of state and local
officials.
To develop, issue, and update interagency assignments that delineate respective
agency capabilities and responsibilities, and define procedures for coordination and
direction for emergency planning and response.
Id. A final finding on the adequacy of the emergency plans is not required for low
power licensing. Instead, interim findings on a plan's adequacy satisfy the NRC's regu-
lations. In re Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 19 N.R.C. 1373, 1381-82 (1984).
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quirements of offsite plans. Part III identifies the complications that
state and local governments present to the licensing process. Part IV
proposes remedies for the offsite emergency preparedness plan prob-
lem. Finally, this Note concludes that recent federal intervention
could effectively prevent anti-nuclear groups from using offsite emer-
gency planning to prevent or delay the licensing of nuclear power
plants.
I. HISTORY OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANS
Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, states voluntarily submitted
emergency plans." Congress feared that requiring state approval of
emergency plans would allow anti-nuclear state legislatures or agencies
to block licensing of nuclear facilities. 2 The federal government and
the nuclear industry believed that the combination of plant safeguards
and NRC regulations would greatly reduce the likelihood of an acci-
dent.' 3 The federal government used this projected low accident
probability to justify its lax regulation of commercial nuclear power.14
The Three Mile Island incident changed perceptions of the
probability of an accident for both the nuclear industry and govern-
ments. ' Federal law has required states, local governments or utilities
to develop and implement an emergency preparedness plan prior to
licensing each nuclear facility.' 6 The NRC also promulgated regula-
11. Sylves, supra note 3, at 394. Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, only 11 of
43 states with nuclear facilities had emergency offsite preparedness plans that met NRC
specifications. Id.
12. Id. at 395. Legislatures or agencies could refuse to prepare emergency plans for
nuclear facilities. Id.
13. Id. at 394. Proponents of nuclear power believe that emergency planning need-
lessly alarms the public because massive evacuation is not feasible. Id.
14. Id.
15. The accident led to a law requiring utilities with nuclear power plants to submit
upgraded emergency plans. The utilities also needed to supply evidence that notifica-
tion and instruction to the public would occur within the 10 mile emergency plannmig
zone. Id. at 396. The evacuation of the area surrounding Three Mile Island was not
accomplished effectively. Conseqently, residents were unnecessarily exposed to radia-
tion. This led to the federal investigation which determined the need for offsite emer-
gency planning and new standards in approving such plans. Id. See also Note,
Federalism and Offsite Emergency Planning for Nuclear Reactors: The Shoreham Im-
passe, 66 B.U.L. REV. 229, 233-34 (1986) (Three Mile Island accident prompted
changes in the licensing of nuclear power plants by requiring offisite planning).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1954) as amended by Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
295, 94 Stat. 781 (1981). The plan must provide for responses to accidents at the facility
and comply with NRC guidelines. In the absence of a plan developed by the state or
1990]
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tions' 7 which specify guidelines for offsite emergency plans. These reg-
ulations provide standards to assess the adequacy' 8 and content 19 of
emergency plans.
Several states have effectively blocked the licensing of nuclear power
plants by not cooperating with the utilities in developing offsite emer-
gency plans.2" The absence of state assistance has reduced the effec-
tiveness of such planning and has made implementation difficult.2
local governments, a utility plan that reasonably assures the health and safety of the
public inside the 10 mile EPZ is acceptable. Id. at 781-82.
17. See infra notes 158-70 and accompanying text (discussing two regulations aimed
at remedying the licensing problem).
18. Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.47(a)(1) (1989). "Adequate" means sufficient for a specific requirement. WEB-
STER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 56 (1986).
19. Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facili-
ties, supra note 6, at Appendix E § IV (1989). The content of a plan consists of organi-
zation (see infra note 25 and accompanying text), assessment actions, activation of
emergency organization (see infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text), notification pro-
cedures (see infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text), emergency facilities and equip-
ment (see infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text), training (see infra notes 105-113
and accompanying text) and recovery. Assessment actions consist of predetermined
levels used to monitor radioactive releases including emergency action levels used to
determine the type of protective measures necessary to protect the public. Emergency
Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, supra note 6, at
Appendix E § IV.B. Recovery involves reentering the nuclear facility following an acci-
dent or when operations could resume, using certain criteria to determine the appropri-
ate time. Id. at IV.H.
20. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1987, § 1, at 50, col. I (state and local officials refuse to
cooperate in developing emergency plans for nuclear power plants). The states which
blocked or are blocking nuclear facilities include Massachusetts, New York and Ohio.
NRC Tentatively Approves Proposal to Permit Licensing of Shoreham and Seabrook Nu-
clear Facilities Without State-approved Emergency Evacuation Plans, 119 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 28, 28-29 (Mar. 19, 1987).
21. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 3-3 (WEST 1989) (state requires major-
ity vote to allow construction or operation of nuclear facilities). But see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 252.60 (West 1975 & Supp. 1989) (state will assist in developing and imple-
menting offisite emergency plans); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 4308 (1988) (state
program will develop emergency plans to mitigate the effects of an accident); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:1104(14) (West 1989) (state requires development and implementa-
tion of a statewide emergency preparedness plan); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B,
§ 954 (1989) (state committee must prepare and review annually an emergency
preparedness plan); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16A, § 7 (1957) (each local organization
whose jurisdiction is within the plume or ingestation zone or will host evacuees from
another jurisdiction within a plume or ingestation zone shall submit an emergency
preparedness plan to the state director); MINN. STAT. § 12.13 (1988) (state agencies
must develop an emergency response plan); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107-B:l (1978 &
Supp. 1988) (state emergency management agency shall assist in developing and imple-
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II. EMERGENCY OFFSITE PLAN REQUIREMENTS
The difficulty in offsite plan implementation arises from the com-
plexity of the plan.2 2 Government regulations require adequate notifi-
cation to the public of emergency planning procedures.2 3 An adequate
notification plan requires yearly dissemination of planned protective
measures to carry out fast evacuations. 24 Job descriptions and respon-
sibilities for government agencies and utilities include numerous com-
plex functions performed under an emergency plan.25 Training to
menting an emergency response plan); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2D-40 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1989) (state department must prepare, adopt, and continually revise a radiation
emergency response plan); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2D-41 (West 1987) (local government
where a nuclear facility is located must submit a local radiation emergency response
plan); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7110.502 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1989) (state agency
must develop an emergency response plan and participate in emergency exercises); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-1.3-2 (1985) (state agency will implement an emergency response plan
and act as governor's principal advisor); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 20, § 43 (1987 & Supp.
1988) (the state emergency response plan includes provisions for personnel and equip-
ment to maintain the effectiveness of the plan). But cf CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25880.4 (West 1984) (nuclear power plant does not need to meet California code re-
quirements until NRC determines adequacy of seismic safety criteria).
22. Sylves, supra note 3, at 399.
23. Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facili-
ties, supra note 6, at Appendix E § IV.D.
24. Id. at Appendix E § IV.D.2. The notification must disclose information such as
methods and times for public notification and protection actions planned in the event of
an accident. Id.
25. These descriptions and responsibilities include:
1. A description of the normal plant operating organization.
2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization with a detailed
discussion of:
a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the individual(s) who will take
charge during an emergency;
b. Plant staff emergency assignments;
c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite emergency coordinator
who shall be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite authorities re-
sponsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures.
3. A description, by position and function to be performed, of the licensee's
headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site to augment the onsite
emergency organization.
4. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of persons within the
licensee organization who will be responsible for making offsite dose projections,
and a description of how these projections will be made and the results transmitted
to State and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate government entities.
5. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of other employees of
the licensee with special qualifications for coping with emergency conditions that
may arise. Other persons with special qualifications, such as consultants, who are
not employees of the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for emer-
1990]
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carry out appropriate emergency responses involves hours of drills and
exercises. The NRC and FEMA use the previous emergency planning
requirements as part of the review and evaluation criteria.
Federal regulations provide sixteen criteria that NRC and FEMA
use to evaluate offsite plans.2 6 They include:
1. Notification to state and local response organizations, emer-
gency personnel and the public;2 7
2. Prompt communication to emergency personnel and the
public; 28
3. Dissemination of information periodically to the public;29
4. Provision and maintenance of adequate facilities and equip-
ment to support emergency responses;
30
5. Protection guidelines for plume exposure pathway EPZ3 for
workers and the public;32
gencies shall also be identified. The special qualifications of these persons shall be
described.
6. A description of the local offsite services to be provided in support of the licen-
see's emergency organization.
7. Identification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate State, local and
Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies.
8. Identification of the State and/or local officials responsible for planning for,
ordering, and controlling appropriate protective actions, including evacuations
when necessary.
Id. at Appendix E § IV.A.
26. Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.47(b) (1989). When compliance with each of the sixteen standards is absent, the
Commissioner can issue a license if any of the following conditions are met:
I. The applicant must demonstrate the deficiencies are not significant for the
plant in question.
2. Compensating actions will occur promptly.
3. There are other compelling reasons to permit licensing.
In re Long Island Lighting Co., 24 N.R.C. 412, 429 aff'd, N.R.C. 561 (1986).
27. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b)(5). Utilization of established initial and follow-up
messages accomplishes the notification criteria. The licensee must have already estab-
lished the means of disseminating such information with clear instructions to the popu-
lace within the 10 mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. Id.
28. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the notification
requirements.
29. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b)(7). Periodic notification to the public of initial action in an
emergency is required. Advance planning is also needed for dissemination of informa-
tion to the media and the public concerning emergency plans. Id.
30. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text (discussing the facilities and equip-
ment requirement).
31. Contents of Applications; General Information, 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(g) (1989).
The plume exposure pathway is the 10 mile radius from the nuclear power plant. Id.
32. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b)(10). The plan requires guidelines for choice of protective
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6. Arrangements for medical services for contaminated or in-
jured individuals;33
7. Periodic exercises and drills;34 and
8. Radiological emergency response training.35
Further discussion of the remaining criteria is not necessary because
they have not received as much criticism.3 6 The enumerated criteria
are controversial 37 and require intense FEMA and NRC study in order
to determine their adequacy in an emergency plan.
Another controversial standard is the methods and procedures for
notifying response organizations. The standards for notification of off-
actions, consistent with federal guidance, and protection for the ingestion exposure
pathway. Id.
33. Id. at § 50.47(b)(12). This includes treatment of individuals at the nuclear facil-
ity and offisite transportation to a medical facility. Emergency Planning and Prepared-
ness and Utilization Facilities, supra note 6, at Appendix E § IV.E.
34. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b)(14). These drills are required to evaluate any deficiencies
in the plan. Additionally, the drills develop and maintain key skills in emergency work-
ers. Id.
35. Id. at § 50.47(b)(15). All emergency workers who will respond to an accident
require this training. Id. The group are fire teams, first-aid and rescue teams, onsite
personnel, and local service personnel. Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Pro-
duction and Utilization Facilities, supra note 6, at Appendix E § IV.F.
36. Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.47(b) (1989). The remaining standards include:
1. Assignment of primary responsibilities to state and local organizations within the
EPZ and the licensee are required. The state and local organizations and the licensee
each need staff that can respond immediately to an accident on a continuous basis.
2. Onsite staff responsibilities in the event of an emergency are defined as adequate
staffing in key areas at all times. The onsite and offsite response activities require in-
terfacing which is delineated in an emergency plan.
3. The ability to use assistance resources and accommodate state and local govern-
ments at a near-site Emergency Operations Facility. These requests are made in ad-
vance along with the identification of other organizations capable of assisting in an
emergency.
4. The licensee is using an emergency classification and action level scheme that
includes the facility system and effluent parameters. State and local response plans call
for reliance on such information provided by the licensee.
5. The plan has adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and moni-
toring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency.
6. Means to control radiation exposure exist. This applies to emergency workers
and is consistent with Environmental Protection Agency guidelines.
7. General recovery and re-entry plans are developed.
8. Plan development and training of planners exist. This includes the development,
review and distribution of emergency plans. Id
37. See infra notes 38-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of each contro-
versial criteria.
1990]
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site response organizationsM require dedicated telephone switches
39
and a telephone list delineating personnel in the order of notification.'
Licensing opponents argue that heavy commercial telephone traffic,
bad weather and other factors41 could create ineffective communica-
tion among response organizations.42 They also contend that without
emergency telephone numbers, the plans could not be effectively imple-
mented in an emergency.43 For some controversial nuclear facilities
the NRC decisions dismissed these claims by denying their validity.'
The most litigated standard is the protective response. The protec-
tive response includes traffic control,45 where traffic congestion could
affect evacuation time estimates.' This standard also addresses evacu-
38. In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 19 N.R.C. 1020, 1063 (1984). The organizations
include municipal police, fire and medical personnel as well as counties, municipalities
and state agencies. Id. See In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 21 N.R.C. 1219, 1352-54
(1985) (utility provided reasonable assurance that a computer dialing system would no-
tify emergency response organizations).
39. 19 N.R.C. at 1063. Dedicated telephone switches are direct links which permit
conference calling and do not depend on the commercial telephone system. Id. See In
re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 28 N.R.C. 667, 728 (1988) (Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board (Licensing Board) determined that the emergency plan contained provisions for
adequate telephone communications).
40. 19 N.R.C. at 1031. The telephone list consists of offsite managers who can
assist in an emergency. These numbers are confidential to prevent the public from jam-
ming telephone lines, thereby frustrating an emergency response. Id.
41. d at 1063. These factors include blackouts, jammed telephone lines, spontane-
ous evacuation inside and outside the plume EPZ and volunteers who will not risk
radiation injury. Opponents also argue that direct telephone links cannot remain func-
tioning 24 hours daily. Id.
42. Id. But see Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 869 F.2d 719, 752-54 (3d Cir. 1989) (notification to off-duty staff at the
Graterford prison will function successfully).
43. 19 N.R.C. at 1031. This contention relates to the absence of a notification sys-
tem that list numbers in the order of notification. Id.
44. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text, noting specific NRC decisions.
45. The opponents of one nuclear power plant contended that several traffic points
outside the 10 mile EPZ needed incorporation into the zone. The Licensing Board held
that additional traffic control was needed in the EPZ to maintain-continually moving
traffic. Although affirming the decision, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals
Board (Licensing Appeals Board) required more traffic control. In re Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 23 N.R.C. 479, 495-97 (1986). See In re Detroit Edison Co., 19 N.R.C. 1108, 1122
(1984) (utility planned for evacuation routes sufficient to withstand NRC standards); In
re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 21 N.R.C. 1219, 1269 (1985) (traffic control in the 10 mile
EPZ adequately met evacuation time estimates required by the NRC); In re Boston
Edison Co., 20 N.R.C. 157 (1984) (Office of Inspection and Enforcement found traffic
management adequate for the Pilgrim facility).
46. Evacuation time estimates provide information on evacuation efficiency to emer-
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ation of the population within the plume EPZ,47 a ten mile EPZ sur-
rounding a nuclear facility.48 Emergency shelters, used to protect
evacuees from within the plume EPZ, require FEMA and NRC ap-
proval.49 Siting for these shelters must be located outside the 10-mile
zone and must accommodate all evacuees.5 ° Moreover, the shelters
must be equipped to decontaminate" or monitor52 evacuees. In many
cases, opponents criticize evacuation plans and shelters as inadequate
to house all evacuees.5 3
Evacuation of handicapped residents within the plume EPZ poses
another problem for emergency planners. In Massachusetts Coalition
of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Defense Agency, et al.," handi-
gency coordinators. Coordinators use this information in deciding what protective ac-
tions to implement. 23 N.R.C. at 485-86. Opponents to the Limerick Station plant
claimed that transportation of transport dependent residents would create additional
bus trips. Consequently, traffic congestion would undermine the accuracy of the time
estimates. Id. See 21 N.R.C. at 1245-50 (Licensing Board found adequate emergency
time estimates for transport dependent population).
47. See in re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 25 N.R.C. 273, 283-84 (1987) (notification to
off-duty prison guards considered adequate because notification occurs prior to declara-
tion of an emergency when telephone lines remain open).
48. Sylves, supra note 3, at 395.
49. In re Long Island Lighting Co., 24 N.R.C. 792, 799 (1986). The NRC regula-
tions require a relocation center capable of registering and monitoring all residents in
the EPZ. Id. See In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 28 N.R.C. 667, 775-76 (1988) (Licens-
ing Board found sheltering for beach population adequate even though the state did not
choose to shelter that population).
50. In re Long Island Lighting Co., 28 N.R.C. 515 (1988). The utility designated
three reception centers approximately forty miles from the plant. Id. at 517. The Li-
censing Appeals Board found that the utility must monitor for radiation the planned
percentage of the population seeking shelter. !L at 522-23. The American Red Cross is
responsible for finding and maintaining these shelters. In re Long Island Lighting Co.,
25 N.R.C. 884, 888-89 (1987). See In re Detroit Edison Co., 19 N.R.C. 1108, 1122-23
(1984) (evacuation shelters are adequate and should contain enough staff); In re Pub.
Serv. Co. of N.H., 28 N.R.C. 667, 724 (1988) (Licensing Board determined that emer-
gency plan contained provisions for adequate sheltering).
51. Decontamination of evacuees is necessary at the emergency shelters. 24 N.R.C.
at 799. See 19 N.R.C. at 1125-26 (methods to decontaminate are adequate and provide
for collection and disposal of radioactive materials).
52. The utility must have monitoring equipment at the shelters. 28 N.R.C. at 529.
See 19 N.R.C. at 1124-25 (utility monitoring systems meet regulatory criteria and gui-
dance); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1A, para. 4308 (1988) (state must develop a monitoring
system to identify radioactive components).
53. See supra notes 45-47, 49-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of evacua-
tion plans and emergency shelters.
54. 649 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1981).
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capped individuals filed a class action suit demanding modification of
defendant's offsite emergency plan.55 The petitioners identified three
arguments concerning discrimination, irreparable harm and due pro-
cess.56 The First Circuit held that the plan did not discriminate or
cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. 7 The court found that be-
cause the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood for success on the
merits, an injunction could not be issued. 8 In addition, the court de-
termined that due process did not guarantee the safety of all residents
within the plume EPZ.59
Another controversial standard concerns prompt notification to
emergency personnel and the public. The standard time for notifica-
tion of state and local agencies is fifteen minutes after declaration of an
emergency. 6° A siren system is one method for promptly notifying the
public.6 ' Sirens are mounted on poles at various locations inside the
10-mile EPZ. If the sirens fail because of a power failure, local officials
would implement a route-alerting system,62 which consists of emer-
gency vehicles using speakers to inform residents of the emergency. 63
55. Id at 72. Due to the agency's receipt of federal funds, the coalition brought suit
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 73. The emergency plan provided
for "(1) notice, warning and instruction to officials and the public; (2) evacuation routes;
(3) evacuation stations and sheltering facilities; (4) provision and protection of food; and
(5) public education about the plan." Id.
56. Id at 75-76.
57. Id. at 74-76. Petitioners also failed to demonstrate that respondent had a legal
duty to include petitioners in the emergency plan. Id. at 76.
58. Id. Petitioners failed to show that the present emergency plan created any of
the injuries alleged. Id
59. Id. at 77-78. The utility must show that the emergency response procedures of
extensive notice and supplemental public transportation satisfy the needs of the handi-
capped. Iad at 78.
60. Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facili-
ties, supra note 6, at Appendix E § IV.D.3.
61. 19 N.R.C. at 1070-71. Within the first five miles of the plume EPZ, the utility,
in order to comply with the 15-minute standard, must alert at least 95% of the house-
holds. The notification requirement for the 5 to 10 mile zone requires at least 90%
notification. In one licensing case, the sirens satisfied the 5 to 10 mile zone but not the
first five miles. In re Carolina Power & Light Co. and N.C. E. Mun. Power Agency, 23
N.R.C. 294, 300-01 (1986), aff'd, 24 N.R.C. 532 (1986), aff'd, 24 N.R.C. 802 (1986).
Cf In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 26 N.R.C. 410 (1987) (state contention on the inade-
quacy of sirens in two towns does not merit reopening the record).
62. 19 N.R.C. at 1071. See In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 21 N.R.C. 1219, 1355
(1985) (route-alerting system resources are adequate to carry out notification).
63. 19 N.R.C. at 1071. Police, firemen and other emergency workers would travel
planned routes to implement this system. Id.
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The tone alert radio system," designed primarily to inform households
of night emergencies, is another notification method which supple-
ments the siren system.65 Opponents attack each notification method,
based on the utilities' inability to alert the required number of people.66
However, a combination of sirens, tone alert radios and route-alerting
is usually considered adequate for immediate notification of emergency
workers and the public. 67
The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) is another method for al-
erting the public. 6' This system, required by the NRC, includes use of
radio and television to inform the public quickly of protective response
procedures. 69
The next controversial standard that the NRC requires is public edu-
cation and information.7 ° Local broadcasters, using the EBS, are re-
sponsible for disseminating all available information.71 The NRC will
not accept the emergency plans unless licensees retain local broadcast-
ers.72 Utilities may also need to inform customers periodically about
the content of evacuation plans through newspapers or media.73
64. Tone alert radio systems are formed by placing radios in households within a
five mile radius of the nuclear plant. The National Weather Service broadcasts a radio
signal in the event of a radiological emergency. The signal causes the receivers to sound
an alarm tone. In re Carolina Power & Light Co. and N.C.E. Mun. Power Agency, 24
N.R.C. 532, 543-44 (1986).
65. 23 N.R.C. at 300. The installation of a tone alert radio system ensures night
notification to households within five miles of the plant. The tone alert system would
increase the notification rate to 98.5% for the Shearon Harris Plant in North Carolina.
Id.
66. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the notification
methods.
67. In re Duke Power Co., 22 N.R.C. 59, 77-78 (1985), aff'd, 22 N.R.C. 785 (1985).
68. In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 19 N.R.C. 1020, 1035 (1984). The EBS will pro-
vide initial and follow up information on procedures to follow in the event of an emer-
gency. Id.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text, noting these criteria as part of the
federal regulations.
71. 19 N.R.C. at 1035.
72. In re Long Island Lighting Co., 28 N.R.C. 311, 325-28 (1988). NRC regula-
tions require that television and radio stations air messages in an emergency. An emer-
gency plan, however, does not require backup stations. The notification process
requires that the lead station broadcast the emergency message and EBS attention sig-
nal. A two-tone attention signal alerts other stations that follow the same procedures as
the lead station. Some of the EBS stations must have their signals reach the EPZ area.
Id.
73. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-245.1:1 (1986) (utilities within the state operating a
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Another controversial standard is that an emergency plan must pro-
vide for adequate emergency facilities and equipment. 74 Government
regulations 75 provide a list of facilities and equipment needed for an
emergency plan.76 The most controversial requirement is for an ade-
quate number of bus drivers and buses. 7 7 Buses are necessary to evacu-
ate school children and other transport dependent persons from areas
near the nuclear facility.78 Opponents frequently challenge the number
nuclear facility must publish in a newspaper the protective actions that will occur in the
event of an emergency).
74. See In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 21 N.R.C. 1219, 1362 (1985) (adequate equip-
ment is necessary to keep roads open allowing for a quick evacuation).
75. Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facili-
ties, supra note 6, at Appendix E § IV.E.
76. Id. Equipment and facilities include:
1. personnel monitoring equipment;
2. equipment to monitor radioactive releases;
3. decontamination facilities for onsite personnel;
4. medical facilities for onsite personnel;
5. on-site treatment of radiation emergencies by physicians or other trained
personnel;
6. transport of contaminated injured individuals from the site to facilities outside
the EPZ;
7. treatment of individuals injured in support of licensee activities on the site at
facilities outside the EPZ;
8. an onsite technical support center and a near-site emergency operations facil-
ity; and
9. one onsite and one offsite communications system.
Id.
77. See In re Long Island Lighting Co., 28 N.R.C. 311, 345 (1988) (Licensing
Board held that the Shoreham plan provided reasonable assurance that enough drivers
and buses were available in the event of an evacuation); In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 23
N.R.C. 479, 515 (1986) (Licensing Appeals Board held that enough buses were avail-
able to evacuate schools in Chester County); In re The Detroit Edison Co., 19 N.R.C.
1108, 1116 (1984) (NRC found bus capacity sufficient to accommodate the transport
dependent population); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 28 N.R.C. 667, 699 (1988) (emer-
gency plan provided for an adequate number of buses and drivers); In re Philadelphia
Elec. Co., 25 N.R.C. 7 (1987) (Licensing Board held, subject to confirmation of other
facts, that the emergency plan provided for enough bus drivers to evacuate the popula-
tion in an emergency); 21 N.R.C. at 1326 (adequate number of buses were available to
evacuate private and public school children); 21 N.R.C. at 1325-26 (adequate number of
bus drivers were available to evacuate transport dependent population); In re Philadel-
phia Elec. Co., 24 N.R.C. 459 (1986) (Licensing Board determined that enough bus
drivers for an evacuation).
78. In re Long Island Lighting Co., 28 N.R.C. 311, 334 (1988). LILCO developed
a plan which used regular bus drivers for any emergency and employee-drivers to
backup the bus drivers. This plan adequately protected against regular driver desertion
in the event of an emergency. Additionally, it provided for evacuation of children in a
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of buses and trained drivers required for an emergency.7 9 The Duke
Power Company combined two emergency facilities in an effort to
lower the costs of facility requirements.80 In Duke Power Company v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"1 Duke appealed an
NRC decision not to exempt the combination of a near-site emergency
operation facility with another facility serving two nuclear power
plants.8 2 The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court decision re-
jecting the combination of the emergency facilities.8 3 The court found
that the Three Mile Island accident revealed a need for close coopera-
tion and coordination with on-site and off-site personnel.84 The Duke
Power proposal would not accomplish this. To preclude a judgment
contrary to the NRC's decision, the court deferred to the NRC's exper-
tise and responsibility.8 5 The court held that because the NRC ren-
single effort. Id. Another utility sent out electric bills with a survey asking individuals
to identify transport dependent individuals. If an evacuation occurred, bus drivers
could transport them to safety. 23 N.R.C. at 486-87. See In re Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc., 26 N.R.C. 53 (1987) (offsite emergency plans were adequate to evacuate
school children); see also Op. Kan. Att'y Gen. 297 (1979) (Division of Emergency
Preparedness could use school buses to evacuate general population).
79. See supra notes 62-3 and accompanying text discussing this necessity.
80. Facilities include a Technical Support Center (TSC), an Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF), a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and a Nuclear Data Link
(NDL). 1980 N.R.C. ANN. REP. 31-33. The TSC supports control-room personnel
during emergencies and conveys radiological and environmental information to the
state and local governments until the EOF is activated. Id. The EOF is located near
the plant, operates the plant during an emergency and is used for plant recovery opera-
tions. The EOF also evaluates potential and actual releases of radioactivity from the
plant. Further, this facility coordinates an emergency response with local, state and
federal emergency response organizations. Id. The SPDS displays the plant parameters
to assess the safety status of operations. Primarily, the SPDS assists operating person-
nel in making immediate decisionq on plant safety status. Id. The NDL is the data
transmission system acting "to provide management personnel at NRC headquarters
with timely, reliable and accurate plant systems, meteorological and radiological infor-
mation." Id.
81. 770 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1985).
82. Id. at 388. The location of the existing EOF resided 125 miles from the Oconee
Nuclear Plant. Id. The requirements under the regulation, however, state that the cen-
ters should lie within 20 miles from the facility. NRC regulations mandate two EOFs,
one within 10 miles of the plant and the other between 10 and 20 miles from the plant.
Id. at 389. Duke Power planned to establish one EOF within 10 miles from the plant
and another 125 miles away. Id.
83. Id. at 391. In rejecting Duke Power's arguments, the court upheld the strict
construction of the regulation. Id.
84. Id. at 390. The NRC adopted this view in other proceedings. Id.
85. Id. at 391. The court stated that absent faulty reasoning and because the com-
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dered its decision after considering all of plaintiff's arguments, the
decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.8 6
The standard medical services for contaminated individuals requires
a list of hospitals that will provide radiation treatment services.8 7
These hospitals must possess the capability to treat severe radiation
injuries.88 Because evacuations might occur, the list should include
hospitals outside the ten mile EPZ.8 9 Further, the American Red
Cross must provide reasonable assurance that evacuees will receive
proper care.90 Emergency planning critics frequently challenge the
quality of care that hospitals will provide for radiation victims.91
In Guard v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,92 the
District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the adequacy of the medical fa-
cilities standard. The NRC had interpreted the standard as requiring
only a list of facilities to handle injured victims.93 The court held that
the interpretation of the standard as requiring a simple list was unrea-
mission gave a reasoned explanation for its position, the court would not overturn the
commission. Id
86. Id. at 390-91. See also Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989) (NRC did not act arbitrarily in con-
cluding that sabotage risks were not obtainable, did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
the contention that guards did not have knowledge about the emergency plan, did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the emergency plan provided for successful function-
ing of the call-up system for off-duty personnel and did not abuse its discretion in deter-
mining that a reasonable evacuation time estimate existed for the area surrounding the
nuclear facility; the NRC abused its discretion, however, in finding that inmates failed
to alert the Licensing Board about the adequate training of emergency personnel pursu-
ant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b)(15)).
87. In re Carolina Power & Light Co. and N.C. E. Mun. Power Agency, 20 N.R.C.
389, 403-04 (1984). The hospital list, however, did not indicate whether the hospitals
could treat severe radiation exposure per se. Id. Instead, the lists were ambiguous,
speaking generally of "victims of radiological accidents" or "contaminated patients."
Id. at 403.
88. Id
89. Id. at 403-04. Petitioner called for the use of medical facilities more than 30
miles from the nuclear facility. In rejecting petitioner's request, the board noted that
the emergency plan under consideration contained a list of hospitals more than 30 miles
away. Id.
90. In re Long Island Lighting Co., 25 N.R.C. 884, 888 (1987).
91. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text which discusses the required qual-
ity of care.
92. 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 1147. The treatment of individuals during an emergency necessitates ar-
rangements for such treatment on an as-needed basis. Id.
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sonable.94 Rather, hospitals listed must maintain trained personnel
and adequate equipment to treat high doses of radiation exposure.95
Though a simple list of hospitals could not assure adequate treatment
for radiation victims, the court found that construction of facilities or
other extraordinary measures is not required for compliance with this
standard.9 6
Emergency preparedness exercises are required biennially for each
nuclear power plant.97 The NRC requires a full-scale exercise within
two years prior to obtaining a full power license. 98 The state must im-
mediately correct any deficiencies discovered in such exercise. 99 In
Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn,l°° the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the results of such emergency
preparedness exercises are not excludable from section 189(a) hear-
ings.101 Section 189(a) provides for a licensing hearing on any material
94. Id. at 1146. If the victims are injured from non-radiation causes, then a list, the
court held, is not sufficient. Id.
95. Id. at 1150, n.7. The court stated that the emphasis is on training people to
perform medical services. Id.
96. Id.
97. Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and
Preparedness, 44 C.F.R. § 350.9(c)(1) (1988). A state having multiple nuclear power
sites shall fully participate "in a joint exercise at some site on a rotational basis at least
every two years." Id. at § 350.9(c)(2). All agencies and governments in the emergency
plan shall participate together with the utility in emergency planning exercises. Id.
98. Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facili-
ties, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E § IV. F.A (1989). The exercises evaluate the offsite
emergency plan. The emergency planning exercise must occur before the emergency
plans are forwarded to FEMA. 44 C.F.R. § 350.9(a). In effect, FEMA approval and
an NRC license depend upon a proper emergency exercise plan. Id. The biennial exer-
cises require full participation by those agencies and governments in the emergency
plan. This two year limit alleviates heavy resource and scheduling burdens that exist if
exercises are conducted annually. Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities, 52 Fed. Reg. 16823, 16824 (1985).
99. 44 C.F.R. § 350.9(a) (1988). See County of Rockland v. U.S. Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n, 709 F.2d 766, 777 (2d Cir. 1983) (enforcement action to correct deficien-
cies unnecessary when corrective action would take place shortly).
100. 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
101. Id. at 1451. Section 189(a) requires a public hearing before issuance of a con-
struction permit. A second pre-licensing hearing is required if an interested party so
requests. Id. at 1438-39. Petitioners appealed an NRC decision denying their petition
to delete a regulation. The regulation required emergency preparedness exercises as
close to licensing as possible. Petitioners claim that the regulation would deny a public
hearing on a material issue of fact. Id. at 1441.
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issue, such as emergency planning." The court distinguished emer-
gency preparedness exercises from pre-operational tests, which are usu-
ally excluded from section 189(a) hearings. 103 Additionally, the court
found that evaluation of emergency exercises require more than one
test or one inspection.1°4
The last controversial standard is the training of emergency person-
nel. The regulations provide a list of personnel who require train-
ing.1"5 Additionally, local service personnel need to undergo
training.10 6 Conducted by FEMA, training includes drills and courses
at a Nevada test site.107 FEMA offers courses in response opera-
tions, 10 8 response coordination,10 9 response planning, ° and proce-
dures relating to the handling of radioactive material in transit.111 The
emergency preparedness exercises test the readiness of personnel.' 12
Emergency planning opponents criticize the adequacy of emergency
workers training.1 1 3
102. Id. at 1438. The material issue in this case concerned the adequacy of the
offsite emergency preparedness plan. Id
103. Id. at 1451. Pre-operational testing involves testing of reactor systems to en-
sure their acceptability for operation. Id.
104. Id. at 1450.
105. Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facili-
ties, supra note 6, at Appendix E, § IV.F. See In re The Detroit Edison Co., 19 N.R.C.
1108, 1118 (1984) (NRC found that offsite emergency workers received adequate train-
ing). See also supra note 35 and accompanying text discussing emergency workers who
require training.
106. See In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 21 N.R.C. 1219, 1318 (1985) (bus drivers,
teachers and other school personnel received adequate training).
107. 1979 NRC ANN. REP. 177.
108. Id. The course is designed for state or local emergency response teams. Id.
109. Id. at 178. This course assists radiological emergency response coordinators in
deciding on necessary protective actions in an accidental release of radioactive material.
Id.
110. Id. The course trains state and local planners. Id.
111. Id. This course is an eight-hour training session consisting of slides and mater-
ials. Id
112. Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facili-
ties, supra note 6, at Appendix E § IV.F, n.4.




III. STATE, LOCAL AND GROUP INTERFERENCE
Anti-nuclear groups,114 and state and local governments, frequently
attack the sixteen licensing standards. Recently, the Long Island
Lighting Company (LILCO) and the Public Service Company of New
Hampshire encountered difficulties in obtaining approved emergency
plans. 15 Because the state of New York and local governments re-
fused to participate in the emergency plan, the NRC withheld approval
of LILCO's Shoreham nuclear facility.116 LILCO subsequently aban-
doned the project and agreed to sell the plant to the state in exchange
for one dollar and a series of rate increases." 1 7
One area of dispute between local governments and utilities involved
the erection of sirens on non-electric transmission poles. In South Cov-
entry Township and James Ottinger v. Philadelphia Electric Com-
pany,' 18 South Coventry Township enforced several zoning
ordinances" 9 prohibiting the installation of siren towers.'2 0 The Phila-
delphia Electric Company (PECO) sued to enjoin the township from
114. The Supreme Court denotes these private groups as obstructionists. Note,
Diablo Canyon Licensing Oversights: Does the NRC Licensing Process Assure Nuclear
Safety?, 21 NEW ENG. L. REv. 77, 84-85 (1985-86). A Department of Energy study
characterized those opposed to nuclear power as "phobia inducers infecting the popu-
late with mental illness." Id. (quoting The Boston Globe, Oct. 30, 1984, at 4, col. 2).
115. In re Long Island Lighting Co., 28 N.R.C. 499 (1988). See infra notes 124-34,
139-43 and 179-83 and accompanying text discussing the difficulties encountered.
116. 28 N.R.C. 499. The utility lacked an adequate plan because state and county
governments lacked the resources necessary to implement the offsite emergency plan
effectively. Id. at 507-08. See In re Long Island Lighting Co., 26 N.R.C. 425 (1987)
(Licensing Board granted summary motion alleging that no state emergency plan ex-
isted); In re Long Island Lighting Co., 24 N.R.C. 412, 430 (1986), aff'd, 24 N.R.C. 561
(1986) (state of New York refused to perform dose projections, sample the ingestation
pathway, interdict contaminated food and issue protective action messages via radio
and television). But cf In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 21 N.R.C. 1219, 1407 (1985) (local
governments within the 10 mile EPZ maintained adequate emergency plans).
117. N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1989, at 2B, col. 3. In exchange for the facility, state
officials agreed to grant ten years of rate increases at 4.5 to 5% per year. The state
would then transfer the plant to the New York Power Authority which would disman-
tle the $5.5 billion plant and build a 240-megawatt gas turbine. Id
118. 94 Pa. Commw. 289, 504 A.2d 368 (1986).
119. Though the ordinances that the court addresses do not mention siren towers,
the court probably refers to the zoning ordinances in order to note the purpose of the
towers and their height.
120. Id. at 290, 504 A.2d at 369. South Coventry Township informed the utility
that it violated the ordinance following the installation of two siren poles. Subse-
quently, the township issued the utility multiple citations. Id. at 291, 504 A.2d at 369.
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enforcing its ordinance.121 The trial court held that the ordinance did
not apply to siren towers, which are part of the utility's facilities. 122
Moreover, the court found PECO would be unduly burdened if it had
to comply with the numerous municipal ordinances that existed. 123
Adopting the South Coventry Township decision, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court, in Town of Rye v. Public Service Company of New
Hampshire,24 held that a municipality did not have the right to revoke
previously granted licenses to erect siren poles.125 The state municipal
highway statutes' 26 allow utilities to erect attachments necessary to
conduct business. 127 Finding that sirens constitute attachments under
the statute, the court concluded that granting the licenses was within
statutory authority.128
However, the First Circuit did not defer to the Town of Rye decision
allowing erection of siren poles. In Public Service Company of New
121. Id. at 291, 504 A.2d at 369.
122. Id. at 297-98, 504 A.2d at 372. Facilities are:
All the plant and equipment of a public utility, including all tangible and intangible
real and personal property without limitation, and any and all means and instru-
mentalities in any manner owned, operated, leased, licensed, used, controlled, fur-
nished, or supplied for, by, or in connection with, the business of any public utility.
66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1979).
123. 94 Pa. Commw. at 296, 504 A.2d at 371. Forty-two municipalities required
installation of siren poles. Id
124. 130 N.H. 365, 540 A.2d 1233 (1988).
125. Idt at 369, 540 A.2d at 1235. The town proffered no safety based justification
to validate revocation of the licenses. Id.
126. One statute states:
Telegraph, television, telephone, electric light and electric power poles and struc-
tures and underground conduits and cables, with their respective attachments and
appurtenances may be erected, installed and maintained in any public highways
and the necessary and proper wires and cables may be supported on such poles and
structures or carried across or placed under any such highway by any person, co-
partnership or corporation as provided in this subdivision and not otherwise.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 231:160 (1982 & Supp. 1988). Another statute provides in
pertinent part:
"the holder of such a license [to erect poles], shall ... be entitled ... to erect...
poles [and] structures .... and to place upon such poles and structures the neces-
sary.., attachments and appurtenances which are required in the reasonable and
proper operation of the business carried on by such licensee . . . ... Id. at
§ 231:161.
127. 130 N.H. at 368-69, 540 A.2d at 1234.
128. Id. at 369, 540 A.2d at 1235. The selectmen of Rye cannot revoke siren pole
licenses unless the poles endanger the safety of highway travelers. Id.
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Hampshire v. Town of West Newbury,129 the court denied the utility's
petition for injunctive relief from the town board's decision to remove
the poles.1 30 The court held that the utility had not suffered irrepara-
ble harm.13 ' Additionally, the town board of selectmen lacked the
power to issue permits. 132 Finally, the court held that removal of the
poles did not deprive the utility of due process. 133 Consequently, the
First Circuit denied the utility the right to erect siren poles without
approval by the town.1 34
Town of West Newbury is distinguishable from Town of Rye because
the New Hampshire statutes in Town of Rye differ in two ways from
the Massachusetts statute. First, the New Hampshire statutes refer to
poles used to transmit power. 131 Second, there are no Massachusetts
statutes which permit "erection of poles required in the reasonable and
proper operation of the business.' 1 36 This difference allows siren poles
in New Hampshire to remain in their original locations. The New
Hampshire statutes allowed the operating purpose to override the pro-
hibition on erecting siren poles. As a result, the utility could imple-
ment an emergency preparedness plan. The Massachusetts statute,
however, denies the utility the right to erect siren poles unless utilized
for power transmission. Hence, the statute seems to inhibit the imple-
mentation of an emergency preparedness plan and licensing of the Sea-
brook facility.
Generally, federal courts do not allow state and local governments
or private groups to interfere with licensing decisions through attacks
on offsite emergency plans.137 In Long Island Lighting Company v.
129. 835 F.2d 380 (Ist Cir. 1987).
130. Id. at 383. Because the utility could not prove irreparable damage or a likeli-
hood of success on the merits, the court denied the petition. Id.
131. Id. The utility submitted no evidence proving that the absence of siren poles
would affect an NRC decision. Id. at 382.
132. Id. at 384. Massachusetts law reserves for towns the right to restrict long term
use on real property. Id. But cf Vernet v. Town of Exeter, 129 N.H. 34, 523 A.2d 48
(1986) (town meeting cannot prohibit selectmen, appointed by the state, from imple-
menting an offsite emergency preparedness plan).
133. 835 F.2d at 385. The court stated that a refusal in a local administrative mat-
ter was not a deprivation of due process. Id.
134. Id. at 384.
135. Town of Rye v. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 130 N.H. 365, 370, 540 A.2d 1233,
1235 (1988).
136. Id.
137. See infra notes 138-56 and accompanying text exemplifying some federal
decisions.
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County of Suffolk,138 for example, the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York invalidated a county law139 which denied the
utility the right to hold emergency preparedness exercises.' 4° The
court found that if it denied preliminary relief the law would cause
irreparable harm. 4 ' The court determined that without the exercises,
the utility could not obtain an adequate emergency preparedness plan
for Shoreham.142
In State of Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 4 3 the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the NRC did not abuse its discretion in failing, after an
earthquake, to reopen a previous NRC decision.'" The state alleged
that the earthquake showed that offsite emergency plan was seriously
inadequate. 145 The court supported the NRC's original findings that
reasonable assurance of the adequacy of the emergency plan existed 14
6
and that the state can revise the plan to cure any inadequacies.147
138. 628 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
139. Id. at 659. Suffolk County Local Law 2-86 § 2 makes it a crime punishable by
fine and imprisonment:
(a) ... [lor any person to conduct or participate in any test or exercise of any
response to a natural or man-made emergency situation if that test or exercise in-
cludes as part hereof that the roles or governmental functions of any Suffolk
County official will be performed or simulated, and if the Suffolk County Legisla-
ture.... has issued via resolution a notice of disapproval of such performance or
simulation of County roles or governmental function [or]
(b) ... [Flor any person to conduct or participate in any test or exercise of any
response to a natural or man-made emergency situation if that test or exercise in-
cludes as part thereof that the roles or governmental functions of any Suffolk
County official will be performed or simulated, and if the person shall have failed to
comply with the procedures set forth in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of this Local Law.
Id. (citing Local Law 2-86 § 2(a), (b), enacted December 23, 1985, approved Jan. 13,
1986).
140. 628 F. Supp. at 666. But see Prospect v. Cohalan, 65 N.Y.2d 867, 868, 482
N.E.2d 1209, 1210, 493 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (1985) (county executive order directing
personnel to collect information for development of a disaster preparedness program
actually commenced plan implementation and thus usurped the legislative function).
141. 628 F. Supp. at 661. The court found that financial losses and the threat of
destroying a business constituted irreparable harm to the utility. Id.
142. Id. at 664-65. The results of the exercises furnish information on the adequacy
of the emergency preparedness plan. The exercises are part of NRC procedures that
evaluate emergency offsite plans. Id. at 665.
143. 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 260. Cf In re Toledo Edison Co., 24 N.R.C. 753 (1986) (court denied
state request for a new hearing based on deficiencies in the emergency plan).





Finding that petitioner failed to show any safety significance,1 48 the
court concluded that, without such evidence, the NRC did not abuse
its discretion. 49
Recently, in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States,150 the
First Circuit addressed the issue of licensing when state or local gov-
ernments failed to participate in the emergency plan. The plaintiffs
challenged the NRC's "realism" doctrine, 5' which assumes that non-
cooperating state and local governments will respond to emergencies
using the utility's plan.' 52 The court held that the NRC's decision was
reasonable and defensible.153 The court also found that the NRC's
presumption of state and local response to the utility's plan was also
reasonable.'" 4 Additionally, the court found that economic considera-
tions did not affect the reasoning behind the new rule, though multi-
billion dollar plants, if abandoned, would create large losses for utilities
and customers.' 55
The above cases demonstrate a common theme of federal court re-
luctance to override NRC expertise in emergency planning. The courts
148. Id. at 262.
149. Id. at 263. The NRC must act inconsistently with the language of the regula-
tion for a court to overturn an NRC decision. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789 F.2d 26, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986). The language of the regulation requires "reasonable assur-
ance of adequate protective measures" for the population around a nuclear facility. Id.
at 30-31. The court concluded that the NRC made a finding of adequate protective
measures. Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 814 F.2d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1987).
Thus, the NRC acted reasonably in denying the state's petition to intervene in the full-
power licensing proceedings. Id. See In re Three Mile Island Alert, Inc., 771 F.2d 720,
738 (3d Cir. 1985) (NRC did not abuse its discretion in finding emergency plans
adequate).
150. 856 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1988).
151. Id. at 380. The court defines the "realism" doctrine as:
A doctrine that allows the NRC, in evaluating a utility emergency plan, to make
the following pair of presumptions: 1) in the event of an actual radiological emer-
gency state local officials will do their best to protect the affected public; and 2) in
such an emergency these officials will look to the utility plan for guidance and will
generally follow that plan.
Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 382-83.
154. Id. at 383. The NRC can reasonably assume that the state and local govern-
ments will follow the only existing emergency plan. Id.
155. Id. at 384. This rule does not on its face, as petitioners claim, consider eco-
nomic factors like nuclear power plant construction costs. 52 Fed. Reg. 42078, 42083
(1987).
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recognize their inability to determine whether the NRC acted unrea-
sonably in approving emergency plans. Without emergency planning
expertise, the courts cannot effectively decide emergency planning dis-
putes between utilities and state and local governments.
IV. REMEDIES TO THE LICENSING PROBLEM
Massachusetts v. United States represents the current efforts within
the federal government to discourage state and local governments from
barring the opening of nuclear power plants. 156 A proposed rule
15 7
would allow the utility to submit an emergency offsite plan when ap-
proval of the plan would depend on the utility's ability to demonstrate
four factors. 158 The four factors are:
(1) The non-compliance could be remedied, or adequately com-
pensated for, by reasonable State or local governmental coopera-
tion; (2) applicant has made a good faith and sustained effort to
obtain the cooperation of the necessary governments; (3) appli-
cants [sic] offsite emergency plan includes effective measures to
compensate for the lack of cooperation which are reasonable and
achievable under the circumstances and which take into account a
likely State or local response to an actual emergency; and (4) ap-
plicant has provided copies of the offsite plan to all governments
which would have otherwise participated in its preparation or im-
plementation and has assured them that it stands ready to cooper-
ate should they change their position.' 59
If the utility can demonstrate these factors, the NRC may issue a full
power license.'6o The proposed rule also excludes mandatory state and
local government participation in an emergency plan when the govern-
ments refuse to participate.
16 1
Another remedial proposal that the federal government recently en-
156. See State Role in Evacuation Plans for Nuclear Plants Still Uncertain, 120 PuB.
UTIL FORT. 35 (1987) (a Congressman supported utility offsite emergency preparedness
plans absent state and local government participation).
157. 52 Fed. Reg. 6980 (1987) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(e) (proposed
March 6, 1987)).
158. Id. at 6981. But see 28 NUCLEONICS WEEK, March 12, 1987, at 4 (Commis-
sioner Asselstine dissents because he believes the proposed rule focuses on economics).
159. 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6981 (1987) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(e) (pro-





acted162 addresses the requirements for issuance of a low power license.
This regulation requires adequate onsite emergency planning and some
offsite planning reasonably required in an emergency. 63 Several rea-
sons support federal enactment of this proposal. First, the fission prod-
uct inventory " is smaller at low power operations than at high power
operations. 165 Second, safety equipment need not have the capacity to
prevent accidents that could occur at high power operations. 166 Fi-
nally, the reaction time for potential emergencies is longer at low
power operations.67 Thus, offsite emergency plans would require re-
view until after approval of a low power license.168 The federal govern-
ment has codified the second proposal and the first proposal should
receive NRC approval.169
Prior to these proposals, the Public Service Company of New Hamp-
shire petitioned the NRC for an exemption from the ten mile EPZ in
In re Public Service Company of New Hampshire.1"0 When the utility
162. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(d) (1989).
163. 53 Fed. Reg. 16435, 16437 (1988). Offsite aspects include: arrangements for
the effective use of offsite assistance onsite, accommodation of state and local staff, iden-
tification of other organizations that could respond to onsite emergencies, initial notifi-
cation with periodic updates by state and local response organizations, adequate
emergency facilities and equipment, arrangements for medical services and available
training for offsite response organizations. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(d) (1989).
164. Fission product inventory is explained as follows: "Short lived isotopes, such
as xenon and iodine, quickly reach an equilibrium inventory and total steady state in-
ventory of these fission products is a direct function of power. Inventories of long-lived
isotopes, such as strontium and cesium, are functions of total fuel burnup. . ." Emer-
gency Core Cooling Systems; Revisions to Acceptance Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 35996,
35997 (1988). In sum, fission product inventory "is a complex function of both time
and power.. ." Id
165. 53 Fed. Reg. 16435, 16436 (1988).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 16437. See Cuomo v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'r, 772
F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (court denied stay of a low power license even when an
adequate emergency plan was unlikely to obtain approval); see also In re Pub. Serv. Co.
of N.H., 24 N.R.C. 141 (1986) (low power licensing requires reasonable assurance with
respect to an adequate onsite emergency plan); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 28 N.R.C.
419, 421 (1988) (adequate offsite emergency plan is not required for a low power licens-
ing approval).
169. NRC Tentatively Approves Proposal to Permit Licensing of Shoreham and Sea-
brook Nuclear Facilities Without State-approved Emergency Evacuation Plans, 119 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 28, 29 (1987).
170. 25 N.R.C. 324 (1987).
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proposed to shrink the ten mile zone to one mile,17 1 the NRC held that
the utility did not prove the feasibility of a one mile zone. 172 Specifi-
cally, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board found that the utility
insufficiently addressed operator reliability,173 containment strength, 174
source-term behavior17' and shutdown accidents 176 to justify approval
of the petition. 177
In In re Long Island Lighting Company,171 the petitioning utility re-
quested summary disposition to obtain approval of its offsite emer-
gency preparedness plan. 179 The Licensing Board denied Long Island
Lighting Company's (LILCO) motion because LILCO had not demon-
strated a workable plan.18 According to the board, LILCO miscon-
strued the "best efforts" doctrine (realism doctrine). 81 Consequently,
the board noted that the NRC requires examination and acceptance of
an adequate offsite emergency plan prior to licensing. 182
The difficulty in obtaining FEMA and NRC approval continues, de-
spite federal politics that allow utilities to submit an emergency plan in
171. Id. at 329. See In re S. Cal. Edison Co., 25 N.R.C. 43 (1987) (municipality
unsuccessfully petitioned to extend the 10 mile zone in order to include itself).
172. Id. at 342.
173. Id. at 341. The record must show how well operator training prepares opera-
tors to recognize off-normal plant conditions, to follow special procedures and to exe-
cute proper actions. Id
174. Id Applicants must heavily consider this factor because the as-built strength
must equal the design strength. Id
175. Id. The use of "WASH-1400" methodology as a means of accident analysis is
not clearly categorically conservative because there have been source-term assessment
advances since introduction of the "WASH 1400" methodology. Id.
176. Id. at 342. The fission product inventory may decay between shutdown and an
accident during shutdown, resulting in high level risk. Id.
177. Id. at 341.
178. 27 N.R.C. 355 (1988).
179. Id. at 357. The motion was based on the best efforts assumption. This as-
sumption relies on state and local government adoption of a utility's emergency plan.
Consequently, the government officials will exercise their best efforts to protect public
health and safety in a radiological emergency. Id
180. Id. at 385-86.
181. Id. at 378. The definition of realism incorporates the "best efforts" doctrine.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting "best" to describe the actions of state
and local government officials). See also supra note 179 (discussion of the "best efforts"
doctrine).
182. Id. at 378. Hence, an emergency plan is not automatically approved when
state and local governments refuse to cooperate. Id.
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place of state and local plans.183 However, an executive order, l8 4 is-
sued by President Reagan, allows federal resources to supplement
state, local and utility resources.1 5 The order empowers FEMA to
assist utilities in implementing an adequate offsite plan that conforms
to federal standards.8 6 Assistance includes use of FEMA resources to
coordinate and manage other available resources and provision for full
reimbursement to the extent permitted by law. 18 7 As a result, non-
cooperating state and local governments may be excluded from the
preparation of an emergency plan.
V. CONCLUSION
With the emergence of new federal rules and executive intervention,
state and local government and private group interference with nuclear
power plant licensing should become moot. 188 Offsite emergency plan-
ning will no longer represent an obstacle to licensing."8 9 Federal inter-
vention will alleviate the burden on utilities for emergency offsite
planning when state or local governments refuse to cooperate. In addi-
tion, judicial review of NRC decision will not help opponents close
183. PR Newswire, May 4, 1988 (LEXIS, Nexis library, PRWire file). The Sea-
brook facility, for example, cannot obtain a low power license because it cannot comply
with the standards for an adequate ofisite emergency plan. Id.
184. Federal Emergency Management Agency Assistance in Emergency Prepared-
ness Planning at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1540 (Nov. 21, 1988). See Commercial Nuclear Power Plants; Emergency Prepared-
ness Planning, 54 Fed. Reg. 31920 (1989) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. Part 352) (FEMA
and NRC promulgated new rules to enforce the executive order).
185. 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. at 1541.
186. Id. FEMA will substitute resources to compensate for non-participation by
state and local governments. Id. See 54 Fed. Reg. at 31927 (federal government will
offier technical assistance for developing an ofrsite emergency response plan, describe the
process of federal resource availability for the licensee, describe the principle response
functions of federal agencies and the process of allocating responsibilities among federal
agencies, and provide for participation of federal agencies).
187. 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. at 1541-42. This includes "advice, technical
assistance, and arrangements for facilities and resources as needed." Id. at 1541. See 54
Fed. Reg. at 31928 (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. Part 352, § 352.28) ("FEMA will coor-
dinate full reimbursement, either jointly or severally, to the agencies performing services
or furnishing resources, from any affected licensee and from any affected non participat-
ing or inadequately participating State or local government.").
188. See supra notes 157-69, 185-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of two
federal regulations and an executive order.
189. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text demonstrating LILCO's obsta-
cle in obtaining licensing approval.
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nuclear power plants. Instead, many courts are reluctant to overrule
NRC decisions that are based on its expertise.
Utilization of federal resources and facilities will enable utilities to
implement aspects of emergency planning that were previously left to
state and local governments. Accordingly, opponents will find fewer
challenges to the adequacy of emergency planning.
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